R: Analysis of Stable Matchings

# Analysis of Stable Matchings

## Documentation for package ‘matchingMarkets’ version 1.0-5

- DESCRIPTION file
- User guides, package vignettes and other documentation
- Package NEWS
- Package README

## Help Pages

matchingMarkets-package | An R package for the analysis of stable matchings.
baac00 | Townsend Thai Project BAAC Annual Resurvey, 2000
hri | All stable matchings in the hospital/residents problem with incomplete lists
hri2 | Resident-optimal matching in the hospital/residents problem with couples
hri3 | Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism) for two-sided matching markets
iaa | Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism) for two-sided matching markets
khb | Karlson-Holm-Breen method for comparing probit coefficients
klein15a | MCMC results in Klein (2015a)
klein15b | Results of Monte Carlo Simulations in Klein (2015b)
plp | Partitioning Linear Programme for the stable roommates problem
predict.stabit2 | Predict method for fitted matching models
rsd | Random serial dictatorship mechanism
sri | All stable matchings in the stable roommates problem with incomplete lists
stabchk | Stability-Check
stabit | Matching model and selection correction for group formation
stabit2 | Matching model and selection correction for college admissions
stabsim | Simulated data for group formation problem
stabsim2 | Simulated data for college admissions problem
ttc | Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm with existing tenants
ttc2 | Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm for a two sided matching problem
ttcc | Top-Trading-Cycles and Chains Algorithm